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Summary
In my paper I propose a new interpretation of a notoriously difficult passage from the
Pseudo-Hippocratic treatise De victu, which deals with the activities of the soul during
sleep. The passage in question has been interpreted by many scholars as a kind of Orphico-
Pythagorean journey of the soul, and thus as key evidence for body-soul dualism in De
victu. However, as I attempt to demonstrate, the soul does indeed take a journey, but not
a Pythagorean one: in my reading of the text, it travels from the periphery deeper inside
the body, to a place the author calls the “oikos of the soul”. I argue that this oikos best corre-
sponds to a kind of ‘cognitive center’, located in the chest and/or heart-region. This type of
soul-journey points not to a dualist but to a materialist interpretation of De victu’s psychol-
ogy. Further, I argue that overall the treatise is closer to the materialist psychophysiology of
such ﬁfth century Presocratics as Diogenes of Apollonia.
Keywords: journey; De victu; Hippocrates; soul; Diogenes of Apollonia; dualism; material-
ism
In meinem Aufsatz schlage ich eine neue Interpretation einer notorisch schwierigen Stelle
aus der Pseudo-Hippokratischen Schrift De victu vor, in der es sich um verschiedene Akti-
vitäten und Bewegungen der Seele während des Schlafens handelt. Die betreffende Passage
wurde von vielen Forschern als eine Art orphisch-pythagoreische Seelenreise gedeutet und
galt lange als Schlüsselbeweis für einen Körper-Seele-Dualismus in De victu. Wie ich jedoch
zu zeigen versuche, unternimmt die Seele tatsächlich eine Reise, aber keine pythagorei-
sche: Laut meiner Hypothese bewegt sich die psyche von der Peripherie tiefer in den Körper
hinein, zu einem Ort, den der Hippokratische Autor als ‚oikos der Seele‘ bezeichnet. Ich
behaupte, dass dieses oikos am besten als eine Art ‚kognitives Zentrum‘ zu verstehen ist, das
sich in der Brust- und / oder Herzregion beﬁndet. Weiter argumentiere ich, dass De victu’s
Seelenlehre der materialistischen Psychophysiologie solcher Vorsokratiker des 5. Jahrhun-
derts, wie Diogenes von Apollonia, näher steht.
Keywords: Reise; De victu; Hippokrat; Seele; Diogenes von Apollonia; Dualismus; Materia-
lismus
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But then begins a journey in my head,
To work my mind, when body’s work’s expired
The philosophical world of the pseudo-Hippocratic treatise De victu is a strange one. It
is a world largely deﬁned by motion, yet it is not a random motion of atoms or ﬂux of
matter, but rather an eternal poreia of all its constituents. In an apparent imitation of
the famous Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus, the author says that “Everything human
and divine periodically travels back and forth. The day and the night go from maximum
to minimum. The moon – from maximum to minimum. The sun goes from its longest
to its shortest path.”1 According to De victu, both the microcosm and the macrocosm
are bound to a kind of back and forth path, a continuous oscillation of all things be-
tween two cardinal points. This peculiar cosmology seems to be at least partly based on
a metaphorical model, which surprisingly is a ‘microcosmic’ one and comes from the
world of human technology. A. Peck aptly calls it the “cosmic saw”.2 We see this princi-
ple operate even at the most basic elemental level of De victu’s system. Fire and Water,
the two cosmic masses out of which everything else is made, are locked in an eternal
game of advance and retreat, always traveling down the same ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω (De victu
I.3), just like two carpenters, who are pulling a saw forward and backward.
There is, however, one principal agent in this system of periodically shifting matter
that seems to deviate from its prescribed upwards and downwards path. Namely, the
soul, or to avoid unnecessary connotations, psyche; a term favored by the author of De
victu but otherwise not very common in the Hippocratic collection. Now, this psyche is a
genuinely puzzling entity. Firstly, it is essentially a ‘Jack-of-all-trades’ responsible for both
mental phenomena, such as cognition, intelligence, and perception, as well as motor
and even reproductive function. Secondly, it is described as a mixture of Fire and Water;
that is, a material substance made of the same stuff the body consists of. Yet, despite
this fact, psyche seems to be not fully bound to the body and capable of independent
existence.
1 De victu I.5: Χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώ-
πινα ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀμειβόμενα. Ἡμέρη καὶ εὐφρόνη
ἐπὶ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον· ὡς σελήνη ἐπὶ τὸ
μακρότατον καὶ βραχύτατον … ἥλιος ἐπὶ τὸ μακρό-
τατον καὶ βραχύτατον.
2 In Peck 1928, xiv.
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Scholars have long been grappling with this rather enigmatic soul-doctrine in an
attempt to pin it to some known type of ancient Greek psychophysiology. But so far, in
this respect, the treatise seems to resist even the most basic categorization: it is unclear
whether it has a purely Materialist concept of the soul or if it adheres to some form
of body-soul Dualism. Many believe, as do I, that the solution to this challenging and
important problem lies in the (correct) interpretation of one particular passage, which
seems to describe a kind of emancipation, or even a journey, of the soul away from the
body. The passage in question comes from the fourth book of De victu, which deals with
dreams – or more precisely, a particular kind of medically prophetic dream – and even
offers a system of medical diagnosis from them.3
In De victu IV.86, which is the object of our study, the author attempts to explain the
underlying mechanism behind such dreams:
Ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἐγρηγορότι μὲν τῷ σώματι ὑπερητέουσα, ἐπὶ πολλὰ μεριζομένη,
οὐ γίγνεται αὐτὴ ἑωυτῆς, ἀλλ’ ἀποδίδωσί τι μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ σώματος, ἀκοῇ,
ὄψει, ψαύσει, ὁδοιπορίῃ, πρήξεσι παντὸς τοῦ σώματος• αὐτὴ δ’ ἑωυτῆς ἡ διά-
νοια οὐ γίνεται.
Ὁκόταν δὲ τὸ σῶμα ἡσυχάσῃ, ἡ ψυχὴ κινευμένη καὶ ἐγρηγορέουσα* διοικεῖ
τὸν ἑωυτῆς οἶκον, καὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος πρήξιας ἁπάσας αὐτὴ διαπρήσσεται.
Τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα καθεῦδον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἡ δ’ ἐγρηγορέουσα γινώσκει, καὶ
ὁρῇ τε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀκούει τὰ ἀκουστὰ, βαδίζει, ψαύει, λυπεῖται, ἐνθυμεῖται,
ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἐοῦσα, ὁκόσαι τοῦ σώματος ὑπηρεσίαι ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς, ταῦτα πάντα ἡ
ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διαπρήσσεται.
*ἐγρηγορέουσα Diels, Jones, Joly; ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ σώματα M (Marcianus graecus 269
saec. X); ἐγρηγορέουσα. τὰ πρήγματα θ (Vindobonensis medicus gr. 4 saec. XI); ἐπε-
ξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος Recentiores, Littré.
Thus, according to De victu:
During wakefulness the soul acts as a servant to the body, it is divided into
many parts, and does not belong to itself, but gives a part of itself to each bodily
function: hearing, sight, touch, locomotion, and all bodily tasks, and does not
take itself into consideration. But when the body is at rest, the soul being in
motion and awake4 manages its own household and performs all the bodily
3 Or prodiagnosis, to be more exact, since according to
De victu dreams of this kind signal diseases that are
not yet manifest, which means that the dreams of
both sick and healthy people should be studied by
the physician. See Hulskamp 2008, 203.
4 ‘Awake’ in my translation obviously renders ἐγρη-
γορέουσα, a reading taken from the manuscript θ,
and adopted by most editors and commentators in-
cluding Joly and Byl 2003; Jones 1931, and more
recently Bartoˇs 2015, 201.
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tasks on its own. The body while asleep is devoid of sense, but the soul being
awake remains conscious: it sees what is to be seen, and hears what is to be
heard, it walks, touches, feels pain, deliberates, all while conﬁned to a narrow
space. How many functions there are of the soul and body, the soul performs
all of them during sleep.
On ﬁrst inspection, it would seem that psyche, while bound to the body during wakeful-
ness, acquires a degree of autonomy during sleep.
Strangely enough, despite the intense scholarly attention this short paragraph has
received in recent years, there still remain glaring textual and interpretative difficulties,
which have been overlooked or glossed over by editors and commentators, and which
need to be solved, if we are to make sense of what psyche actually does, how it acquires
its autonomy, and how this autonomous state should be understood. Only after all this
textological legwork is done, can we proceed to larger and ultimately more important
questions about psyche’s material or non-material status and the philosophical origins of
De victu’s ‘psychology’.
De victu IV.86 has ﬁrst been interpreted by A. Palm as a reﬂection of what he called
an ‘Orphic’ doctrine.5 What Palm meant was that De victu’s description of the soul be-
coming active during sleep and thus acquiring prophetic powers closely resembles the
tradition associated primarily with such ancient Greek miracle workers as Aristeas and
Hermotimos, who fell into a kind of trance, when their souls would leave their bod-
ies and travel far and wide appearing in different places and foretelling epidemics and
natural disasters.
Palm was later followed by E. R. Dodds,6 who famously suggested that such doc-
trines are shamanistic in origin, and then by Marcel Detienne,7 who attempted to
strengthen Palm’s and Dodds’ thesis by adducing a fascinating parallel from an appar-
ently ‘Orphico-Pythagorean’ passage in Plato’s Phaedo about sleep and puriﬁcation. In
Phd. 67c 5 67d 1, katharsis is described as a retreat of the soul from the body (πανταχό-
θεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος) with the ultimate goal of achieving almost complete independence
and liberation from the “bodily shackles”.8 On ﬁrst glance, this description of katharsis
5 Palm 1933, 62–68.
6 Dodds 1951, 118–119.
7 Detienne 1963, 71–72.
8 Pl. Phd. 67c 5–67d 1: Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ το-
ῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ
χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν
καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ
σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι, καὶ
οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ
ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ’ αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ
[ἐκ] δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. In Harold Fowler’s
translation: “And does not the puriﬁcation consist
in this which has been mentioned long ago in our
discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul
from the body and teaching the soul the habit of
collecting and bringing itself together from all parts
of the body, and living, so far as it can, both now
and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as
from fetters?”
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does indeed look similar to De victu both in thought and in wording.9
This outward similarity was accepted unquestioningly by, among others, R. Joly
in his seminal edition and standard commentary of the treatise,10 and thus became re-
ceived wisdom among modern scholars. Still, there were some dissenters, most notably
G. Cambiano, who challenged Detienne’s view and proposed an entirely ‘Materialist’
interpretation of the phenomenon of enypnia in De victu.11 He rightly observed that the
parallel between Phaedo and our Hippocratic author is largely superﬁcial: ﬁrst, there is
no mention of sleep in Plato, and second, katharsis, understood as a liberation of the soul
from the body, is a desired permanent state and not just a condition that occurs when
the body is inactive. Moreover, according to Cambiano, the ‘Orphico-Pythagorean’ idea
that the soul becomes active and wanders away while the body lies in some state of un-
consciousness (sleep or trance), is not present in De victu at all. In IV.86 it explicitly states
that the soul remains active during both sleep and wakefulness.
It is unfortunate that scholars almost entirely overlooked this very valid criticism.
Joly, for example, although he cites Cambiano in his commentary, still maintains that
there are essentially two concepts of psyche in De victu, or rather, that the term is used
in two basic senses: (1) a material substance and (2) an entity that is presumably imma-
terial, or at least – and Joly is not very clear on this point – somehow different from
the body. This perceived dual nature of psyche has troubled scholars ever since. P. van
der Eijk12 tried to escape this conundrum by questioning – quite rightly, I believe – the
entire Materialism vs. Dualism framework.13 H. Bartoˇs, although he insists that psyche
in De victu is indeed wholly material – it is a Fire/Water mixture that may be affected
by digestion and other bodily processes – seemingly follows the same line of reasoning
when he insists that De victu’s ‘soul-doctrine’ is essentially a Materialist interpretation of
Pythagorean transmigration. Thus, the same goes for the liberation of the soul during
sleep: it is a ‘Pythagorean’ χωρισμός but conceived in Materialist terms.14
To sum up: most current research seems to agree that the sleep-doctrine in De victu
IV.86 should be understood as a separation of the soul from the body. It is important,
however, to distinguish the two types of ‘Orphico-Pythagorean’ comparanda typically
cited in this context. Detienne thinks that the author of De victu is talking about puriﬁca-
tion, which means that the soul aims to be independent of the body as much as possible
9 Cf. for example Phd.: τὴν ψυχὴν … οἰκεῖν … μόνην
καθ’ αὑτήν and De victu: (Ὁκόταν δὲ τὸ σῶμα ἡσυ-
χάσῃ) ἡ ψυχὴ … διοικεῖ τὸν ἑωυτῆς οἶκον, καὶ τὰς
τοῦ σώματος πρήξιας ἁπάσας αὐτὴ διαπρήσσε-
ται. Also note the similarity of expression in the two
passages: οἰκεῖν and διοικεῖν, ψυχὴν … μόνην καθ’
αὑτήν and ἡ ψυχὴ … οὐ γίγνεται αὐτὴ ἑωυτῆς.
10 Joly and Byl 2003, 28: “Ce texte est le témoignage le
plus détaillé d’une doctrine d’origine chamanique:
pendant le sommeil, l’âme est ramassée sur elle-
même et plus active que pendant la veille”.
11 Cambiano 1980.
12 Van der Eijk 2005, 198.
13 Van der Eijk 2005, 199.
14 Bartoˇs 2015, 201–207.
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and at all times. Others suggest that the closest analogy is not katharsis, but another re-
lated doctrine, namely the ‘extatic’ journey of the soul when it leaves the sleeping body
and travels on its own, thus gaining its prognostic knowledge, as it were, en route.
Still, we should ask ourselves: Are both those parallels legitimate? If the soul in De
victu does indeed make a journey, what is its ‘itinerary’? Besides, if it does indeed separate
itself from the body, how exactly does this separation work? Finally, how does the soul
become aware of the body’s coming afflictions, the early signs of which it shows us in
dreams?
Recently, van der Eijk has proposed an alternative interpretative scheme, according
to which the relationship of the soul to the body in De victu is that that of degrees of
separation, without full separation ever occurring.15 While I accept that this is indeed
the right approach, in my estimation, it can be elaborated further.
If we take a close look at the text as it stands in our best editions we quickly notice
that the reading ἐγρηγορέουσα (awake) is not an original manuscript reading but a par-
tial emendation of an originally corrupt text. The tradition diverges in this particular
place, and both our oldest and most important manuscript give mostly unintelligible
readings. The eleventh-century Vienna codex, which goes by the siglum θ, reads ἐγρη-
γορέουσα. τὰ πρήγματα. While the earlier Marcianus Graecus (tenth century, siglum
M) gives an equally difficult reading, ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ σώματα. Obviously both variants
are incomprehensible as they stand, so neither can be fully accepted, but for some rea-
son most scholars – including Joly, Jones, Diels,16 and many others – have opted for the
smoother and less problematic reading of the MS θ (ἐγρηγορέουσα), but without the
incomprehensible τὰ πρήγματα.
I believe, however, that they chose the wrong reading: the form ἐγρηγορέουσα is
indeed rare,17 but the reading given by M, ἐπεξέρπουσα, is an absolute hapax legomenon
found only in De victu IV.86 and nowhere else. Moreover, ἐπεξέρπουσα is supported by
other passages from De victu: the author says three times that psyche ἐσέρπει (‘crawls’,
‘creeps’) into the body (De victu I.6, 7, 25). Thus, overall, ἐπεξέρπουσα is not only the
more difficult reading but also the better one.
But even if we adopt ἐπεξέρπουσα instead of ἐγρηγορέουσα, as I think we should,
we are still facing a problem with the word τὰ σώματα, which comes directly after ἐπε-
ξέρπουσα in the manuscript M. The famous editor of Hippocrates, E. Littré, was keenly
15 Van der Eijk 2012.
16 Diels 1910, 146–147; Jones 1931, 475; Joly and Byl
2003, 219.
17 Unlike the more common ἐγείρουσα (present par-
ticiple of ἐγείρω), ἐγρηγορέουσα (from ἐγρηγο-
ρέω) occurs in the Hippocratic corpus only once
(or twice if we accept it in this passage). According
to LSJ it appears for the ﬁrst time in Xen. Cyn. 5.11,
but is likely a lectio falsa, and after that in Arist. Pr.
877 a 9.
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aware of this difficulty and made the sensible decision to adopt the reading of the recen-
tiores of the M family: ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, which to my mind is a far
superior editorial choice than the universally accepted ἐγρηγορέουσα, especially since
we ﬁnd exactly the same form, ἐγρηγορέουσα, directly in the next sentence: ἡ δ’ ἐγρη-
γορέουσα γινώσκει etc. Littré takes ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος to mean: “l’âme
…parcourant les parties du corps,” which is somewhat vague, because, ﬁrst of all, ἕρπω
in ἐπεξέρπω is unlikely to have lost its original meaning of ‘to slither’ (the author delib-
erately uses the form ἐσέρπω, ‘creep into’, to describe the movements of the soul); and
secondly, because it is unclear how Littré imagined the soul’s ‘trajectory’; when it runs
or creeps through the extremities of the body, does it travel from periphery to center, or
from center to periphery?
We obviously have no examples for ἐπεξέρπω, but the combination of ‘ἐπεξ- + verb
of spatial motion + direct object’ is by no means rare. Littré, I think, was quite right in
taking ἐπεξέρπω to be broadly synonymous with ἐπέξειμι/ἐπεξέρχομαι, both of which
when used in their literal sense with an accusative seem to mean roughly speaking ‘to go
entirely through and leave behind’. LSJ gives the following examples of this usage: Hdt.
7.166 τὸ πᾶν γὰρ ἐπεξελθεῖν διζήμενον Γέλωνα (Gelon has been everywhere – literally,
has traversed all places – in search of him); Hdt. 4.9 πάντα δὲ τῆς χώρης ἐπεξελθόντα
τέλος ἀπικέσθαι ἐς τὴν Ὑλαίην (having traveled through every part of the country, he
ﬁnally arrived at Hylaia); and Clearch. (FHG II 315) πάντας τοὺς ὀρείους ἐπεξῄει δρυ-
μούς (went through all the mountain thickets).
These comparanda can give us a sense of the type of motion implied in ἐπεξέρπειν,
but do not clarify in which direction psyche might be traveling. To solve this problem,
we need to take a closer look at the rest of our passage:
(ἡ ψυχὴ) ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος διοικεῖ τὸν ἑωυτῆς οἶκον, καὶ τὰς
τοῦ σώματος πρήξιας ἁπάσας αὐτὴ διαπρήσσεται. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα καθεῦδον
οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἡ δ’ ἐγρηγορέουσα γινώσκει, καὶ ὁρῇ τε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀκούει
τὰ ἀκουστὰ, βαδίζει, ψαύει, λυπεῖται, ἐνθυμεῖται, ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἐοῦσα etc.
The soul ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος18manages its own household and
performs all the bodily tasks by itself. The body while asleep is devoid of sense,
but the soul being awake remains conscious: it sees what is to be seen, and hears
what is to be heard, it walks, touches, feels pain, deliberates, all while conﬁned
to a narrow space.
18 I have intentionally left this short phrase untrans-




Thus, the soul left to its own devices ‘manages its household’. Scholars have understood
the strange expression διοικεῖ οἶκον to mean something like ‘minds its own business’ or
‘becomes her own mistress’. As Wilamowitz has pointed out,19 οἶκον οἰκεῖν is a generic
‘Ionic formula’ (Ionisches Sprichwort); yet, I am convinced that in this particular case it is
not generic at all but refers to something rather concrete, for in the next sentence the
author says that psyche performs all the activities of the body (seeing, hearing, touching,
walking, etc.), all while enclosed in an unspeciﬁed narrow space (ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἐοῦσα).
Scholars have been baffled by this remark as early as S. Mack, who promptly dealt
with it by replacing ἐν ὀλίγῳ with ἑνὶ λόγῳ, thus simplifying and trivializing a perfectly
transmitted and absolutely intelligible text. This unjustiﬁed emendation, unfortunately,
made its way into Jones’ otherwise excellent Loeb edition of De victu.20 It should be said
in his and Mack’s defense, that at least they acknowledged the problem with ἐν ὀλίγῳ,
which is more than can be said of modern commentators, who just seem to ignore it
altogether. To my mind, the most natural interpretation of this passage would be that
psyche is conﬁned to a small enclosure, situated somewhere inside the body, and that the
enigmatic oikos of the soul refers to the same thing. Thus, if during wakefulness the soul
is spread throughout the organism and performs all its sensory and motor functions, but
during sleep ﬁnds itself inside a narrow space or oikos, then I suggest it must have arrived
there by traversing the extremities of the body (ἐπεξέρπουσα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος).21
Many have noted that the closest parallel to this doctrine is not Plato, but a much
later text – a short tract on medical diagnosis from dreams attributed to Galen called De
dignotione ex insomniis.22 According to this treatise, medically relevant dreams – that is,
dreams that signify disease or disturbance in the body – occur because the soul leaves
the sensory organs and dives into its depths:
ἔοικε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις εἰς τὸ βάθος τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ εἰσδῦσα καὶ τῶν
ἐκτὸς ἀποχωρήσασα αἰσθητῶν τῆς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα διαθέσεως αἰσθάνεσθαι.
It appears that the soul during sleep dives deep into the body, and having left
behind the outward sensations, perceives the body’s disposition.23
This notion of sleep seems to be of Stoic origin or at least stoically inﬂuenced: if we are
to trust our doxographic sources, the Stoics described sleep as a retreat of the soul from
19 In Fredrich 1899, 206.
20 Jones 1931, 475.
21 The present tense of the participle in this sentence
need not be taken literally; that is, as describing an
action simultaneous with διοικεῖ. For example, in
De victu I.25 (ὅστις δύναται πλείστους ἀνθρώπους
τρέφειν, οὗτος ἰσχυρός· ἀπολειπόντων δὲ τούτων,
οὗτος ἀσθενέστερος; whoever is capable of feeding
the most people, is strong; but should they leave,
he is weaker), the present participle ἀπολειπόντων
seems to have both a temporary and a conditional
sense and likely refers to a completed action.
22 Bartoˇs 2015; Hulskamp 2008, 202–204.
23 Gal. On Diagnosis from Dreams 6.833, 17.
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the periphery to the hegemonikon.24
This similarity between an early Hippocratic text25 and a much later Stoic doctrine
is surprising indeed, but before we can attempt to explain it, there are other clariﬁcations
to be made. We have learned so far that the soul’s journey in De victu is not a mystic or
a Pythagorean one: the soul does not leave or liberate itself from the body in pursuit
of prophetic knowledge but descends into its depths, where its ‘home’ is to be found.
Iwould suggest that this ‘retreat’ or ‘home’ of the soul may cautiously be identiﬁed,
although my argument is by no means conclusive and should be entertained only as a
working hypothesis.
There is in De victu another, regrettably no less difficult, paragraph that describes an
arrangement or diakosmesis of the human organism by a type of creative ﬁre. This ﬁre
has arranged everything in such a way that “the large corresponds to the small and the
small to the large”, this means that the human body is shaped in ‘imitation’ (apomimesis)
of the macrocosm: the stomach corresponds to the sea; the ﬂesh around it to earth; and
then there are three concentric circuits, called periodoi, situated above the stomach, in
the chest-region, and in the ‘outer periphery’, which alternatively may be the skin or the
head:
Ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ πάντα διεκοσμήσατο κατὰ τρόπον αὐτὸ ἑωυτῷ τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸ
πῦρ, ἀπομίμησιν τοῦ ὅλου, μικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς μικρά· κοιλίην
μὲν τὴν μεγίστην, ὕδατι ξηρῷ καὶ ὑγρῷ ταμεῖον, δοῦναι πᾶσι καὶ λαβεῖν παρὰ
πάντων, θαλάσσης δύναμιν, ζώων συμφόρων τροφὸν, ἀσυμφόρων δὲ φθορόν·
περὶ δὲ ταύτην ὕδατος ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ σύστασιν· διέξοδον πνεύματος ψυ-
χροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ· ἀπομίμησιν τῆς γῆς, τὰ ἐπεισπίπτοντα πάντα ἀλλοιούσης.
καὶ τὰ [μὲν] ἀναλίσκον τὰ δὲ αὖξον σκέδασιν ὕδατος λεπτοῦ καὶ πυρὸς ἐποι-
ήσατο ἠερίου, ἀφανέος καὶ φανεροῦ, ἀπὸ τοῦ ξυνεστηκότος ἀπόκρισιν, ἐν ᾧ
φερόμενα πάντα ἐς τὸ φανερὸν ἀφικνεῖται ἕκαστα μοίρῃ πεπρωμένῃ. Ἐν δὲ
τούτῳ ἐποιήσατο πυρὸς περιόδους τρισσὰς, περαινούσας πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ
εἴσω καὶ ἔξω· αἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα τῶν ὑγρῶν, σελήνης δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ [πρὸς
τὴν ἔξω περιφορήν]* πρὸς τὸν περιέχοντα πάγον, ἄστρων δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ μέσαι
καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω περαίνουσαι <ἡλίου δύναμιν ἔχουσι>**.
Τὸ θερμότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ, ὅπερ πάντων κρατεῖ, διέπον ἅπαντα
κατὰ φύσιν, ἄθικτον καὶ ὄψει καὶ ψαύσει, ἐν τούτῳ ψυχὴ, νοῦς, φρόνησις,
24 Compare for example the deﬁnition of sleep in an-
other medical text of Stoic origin, the Deﬁnitiones
medicae 19.381.15 Ὕπνος ἐστὶν ἄνεσις ψυχῆς κατὰ
φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν περάτων ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν (Sleep is
the naturally occurring retreat of the soul from the
periphery to the hegemonikon).
25 Scholars for the most part agree that De victu cannot
be older than the end of the ﬁfth or the beginning




αὔξησις, κίνησις, μείωσις, διάλλαξις, ὕπνος, ἐγρήγορσις· τοῦτο πάντα διὰ πα-
ντὸς κυβερνᾷ, καὶ τάδε καὶ ἐκεῖνα, οὐδέκοτε ἀτρεμίζον.26
* [πρὸς τὴν ἔξω περιφορήν] secl. Fredrich ** <ἡλίου δύναμιν ἔχουσι> add. Joly; πρὸς
τὰς ἑτέρας ἡλίου δύναμιν Diels–Kranz. Cf. De victu IV, 89 ἄστρων μὲν οὖν ἡ ἔξω πε-
ρίοδος, ἡλίου δὲ ἡ μέση, σελήνης δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα.
In a word, all things were arranged in the body, in a fashion conformable to
itself, by ire, a copy of the whole, the small after the manner of the great and
the great after the manner of the small. The belly is made the greatest, a steward
for dry water and moist, to give to all and to take from all, the power of the sea,
nurse of creatures suited to it, destroyer of those not suited. And around it a
concretion of cold water and moist, a passage for cold breath and warm, a copy
of the earth, which alters all things that fall into it. Consuming and increas-
ing, it made a dispersion of ﬁne water and of ethereal ﬁre, the invisible and the
visible, a secretion from the compacted substance, in which things are carried
and come to light, each according to its allotted portion. And in this ﬁre made
for itself three concentric ﬁery circuits: those towards the hollows of the moist,
the power of the moon; those towards the outer periphery, towards the solid
enclosure, the power of the stars; the middle circuits, bounded both within and
without <has the power of the sun>. The hottest and strongest ﬁre, which con-
trols all things, ordering all things according to nature, imperceptible to sight
or touch, wherein are soul, mind, thought, growth, motion, decrease, muta-
tion, sleep, waking. This governs all things always, both here and there, and is
never at rest.27
There are numerous problems with this passage, such as, the macrocosmic and the
anatomical identiﬁcation of the three circuits, as well as their physiological function
and connection to psyche and the ‘hottest and strongest ﬁre’ mentioned at the end of the
passage, where it is somehow located.
First, the middle circuit is not identiﬁed with the sun expressis verbis: the reading
“the middle concentric circuits have the power of the sun” (αἱ δὲ μέσαι καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω
περαίνουσαι ἡλίου δύναμιν ἔχουσι) is, in fact, a long-accepted editorial emendation.
Luckily, however, the exact macrocosmic correspondences of the circuits are established
beyond doubt in De victu IV.89: ἄστρων μὲν οὖν ἡ ἔξω περίοδος, ἡλίου δὲ ἡ μέση, σε-
λήνης δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα (the outer circuit is the circuit of the stars, the middle circuit
– of the sun, and the one next to the cavity (of the stomach) is that of the moon).
26 De victu I.10.
27 The passage is extremely difficult, and I presently
cannot touch on all its philological problems. I
quote the excellent translation by Jones 1931 with
a few of my own very slight alterations.
84
the paths of the soul in the pseudo-hippocratic de victu
As for their anatomical correspondences, they are even more difficult to pinpoint
with any certainty. Hüffmeier infers from a parallel passage (De victu I.9. cf.) that they
must be identiﬁed with the so-called ‘hollow vessels’ (φλέβες κοῖλαι).28 As for their
physiological function, he describes them as a kind of ‘metabolic center’ (“Zentrum des
Stoffwechsels”), since they are the carriers of blood, breath, digested nutrition, and also
– it would seem – psyche. Although this is far from certain: while the anonymous author
does mention a ‘circuit of the soul’ he never plainly equates it with one of the three
periodoi.
Now, apart from being bound to a certain, not clearly identiﬁed circuit, psyche is
also explicitly associated with a particular type of Fire, which the author calls ‘the hottest
and strongest’;29 thus, to understand the soul’s exact role and place in this convoluted
scheme, we need to know exactly what this Fire is and where it is located. Joly apparently
thinks that the θερμότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ is the same creative ﬁre mentioned at
the beginning of the chapter; that is, the one that arranges the microcosm. He is also
vague about its connection to the periodoi.30 Jouanna, on the contrary, assumes that the
hottest Fire must be placed in the middle circuit, making it thus the periodos of the soul.31
Bartoˇs, who prefers to err on the side of caution, thinks this interpretation “certainly
possible” but “not conclusive”, yet I suspect that it may be further strengthened if we
could get a ﬁrmer grasp of the transmitted text.32
The universal assumption that the phrase that immediately precedes τὸ θερμότατον
καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ is corrupt seems to me far from certain. The Latin translation,
which represents a branch of tradition independent from both the manuscripts M and
θ, in this case agrees with both of them and does not register a lacuna. It reads: illi
autem qui medii sunt et intus et foris agunt calidissimum (sic!) et fortissimus ignis, propter quod
itaque omnia tenet et singula gubernat secus naturam.33 Therefore, I do not think that the
text needs an extensive emendation such as ἡλίου δύναμιν ἔχουσι but can be read as it
stands αἱ δὲ μέσαι καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω περαίνουσαι [verb in the ellipsis] τὸ θερμότατον καὶ
ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ etc., which is to be understood as ‘the middle circuits <contains> the
hottest and strongest ﬁre’. This, in turn, would correspond perfectly with the periodos of
the sun – the strongest and hottest ﬁre in the cosmos.
28 This identiﬁcation is based on De victu I.9. cf.
Hüffmeier 1961, 71). The expression φλέβες κοῖλαι
in the Hippocratic corpus refers to many different
types of vessels and is of course not to be confused
with the modern medical term venae cavae.
29 Despite the fact that the soul is regularly described
as a mixture of Fire and Water, its identiﬁcation
with Fire is not surprising per se. After all, the soul’s
‘higher’ intellectual qualities seem to depend pri-
marily on its ﬁery component. Cf. De victu I.35.15
ff. For example, when Water dominates in the soul-
mixture, the unfortunate owners of such souls are
slow and unintelligent.
30 Cf. Joly and Byl 2003, 241.
31 Jouanna 2012, 205.
32 Bartoˇs 2015, 196.
33 I cite the Latin text according to Deroux’s and Joly’s
1978 edition Deroux and Joly 1978.
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This suggests that Jouanna’s initial interpretation is likely correct: the sentient and
regulatory Fire that contains psyche is indeed conﬁned to the middle circuit, which must,
therefore, be its periodos. Hence, it seems plausible that the ‘narrow enclave’, the oikos
where psyche retreats during sleep, is also to be found in this middle periodos, which has
been alternatively identiﬁed as the vessels in the chest region or, more speculatively, as
the heart.34 The notion that the chest-circuit is the mysterious ‘home of the soul’ is, of
course, hypothetical; however, it does ﬁnd some corroboration in a passage from De
victu III.71 and IV.93 where it is implied that the ‘circulation’, or periodos, of the soul
continues during sleep.
To sum up what we have learned so far: we know that during wakefulness the soul
is spread throughout the body. It is likely present in all three bodily circuits but is clearly
not conﬁned to them. From a passage in De victu I.35 we learn that the soul also travels
through certain pathways or channels (poroi), which connect it to the bodily periphery
and which may become blocked and, thus, hinder its movements. Therefore, I suggest
that the psychophysiology of sleep and dreaming in De victu is best described as a type of
journey or path: while the organism is awake, the soul is dispersed within the circuits and
channels, but during sleep it creeps back into its proper home, which (hypothetically)
is found in the μέση περίοδος, that is, the circuit blood vessels in the chest region.
The description of the soul’s activities during sleep is thus, I believe, devoid of any
‘Pythagorean’ or ‘Orphic’ inﬂuences. What is described in De victu IV.86 is neither an
out-of-body journey nor a χωρισμος,́ but something quite the opposite: the soul never
loses contact with the body, neither during wakefulness nor during sleep, it just travels
deeper inside the body to its proper ‘home’, which I have (strictly hypothetically) placed
in the middle circuit in the chest. This journey from the bodily periphery to the oikos
provides the soul with data on the current state of the body, which are presented in
dreams in an indirect form.
How does the soul acquire its knowledge about the state of the body and the not-
yet-manifest disturbances, which it later communicates in dreams? The dream-theory in
De victu is a complex one. The author distinguishes between different types of prognos-
tic dreams according to their subject matter: from dreams that mimic a person’s daily
activities, to dreams about natural phenomena, or nightmares about misshapen bodies
and monsters. Generally speaking, this theory is based on the same parallelism between
the micro- and the macrocosmos that we have observed in De victu I.10: in dreams all
the bodily organs are represented by their macrocosmic counterparts. For example, an
irregular appearance of the sun, moon, and stars, is a sign of problems in their respective
periodoi in the body.
34 Hulskamp 2008, 163; Joly 1960, 41–43.
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Although these dreams are treated as an important diagnostic and prognostic tool,
the physiological mechanism by which they occur, although the author tries to explain
it in De victu IV.86, remains unclear. Most have thought that the soul separates itself
from the body and thus somehow gains insight into future events (in this case loom-
ing maladies), just like in the tales of the journeys of Hermotimos’ or Aristeas’ soul. I
suggest that the soul does indeed take a journey but a journey of a different kind: it
is while traveling through the limbs and the other circuits (towards its home) that the
soul amasses its knowledge about the body’s current state. In a sense, it is also a ‘cosmic
journey’ since the body is an ‘imitation’ of the macrocosm.
Bearing all this in mind, we can now touch upon the problem of Materialism versus
Dualism in De victu. I believe, based on the evidence of De victu IV.86, that it is unnec-
essary to postulate any sort of Dualism or even a special Materialist interpretation of
Dualism. On the contrary, De victu’s soul-doctrine shows some common traits with a
certain type of Materialist psychophysiology, which, although its roots are sometimes
traced back as early as Anaximenes, was ﬁrst fully ﬂeshed out by Diogenes of Apollo-
nia in the ﬁfth century BCE. Diogenes’ theory, shared by the author of the Hippocratic
tract De morbo sacro, postulates a material substance (in the case of Diogenes, warm air),
which is the carrier of intellectual, sensory, motor, and to some degree even reproductive
function. This air enters the body from without (with breath) and is then distributed
inside it via special channels, while a certain ‘higher’, ‘purer’ portion of it settles in the
brain, which thus becomes a kind of ‘command center’ within the body. This inner aer
is also conceived as the actual ‘organ of perception’, while the eyes, ears, etc. are just its
ducts, or channels through which it travels. Thus, I think that overall De victu is closer
to Diogenes’ model than it is commonly believed.35
To reiterate, according to De victu, psyche is a material substance with a variety of
functions from mental to motor and reproductive, which is spread within the body but
also has its own proper place, or ‘home’. As I have speculated, this home is probably also
the locus of higher intellectual and regulatory functions and is situated in the so-called
‘middle circuit’; that is, blood vessels in the chest/heart region. Also in De victu IV.86,
the soul is described as exclusively responsible for perception, which echoes Diogenes’
35 Jouanna in Jouanna 2012 has famously and impres-
sively argued that Regimen owes much of its Seelen-
lehre to Empedocles; especially the notion that the
Soul’s intelligence depends on the state of mixture
of its primary constituents. While it is certainly true
that there are Empedoclean inﬂuences in Regimen’s
psychology, some points of comparison outlined by
Jouanna strike me as less persuasive. For example,
psyche in both cases is a ﬂuid substance but this is
never made explicit in Regimen, on the contrary,
it is said to enter from the outside into every ani-
mal that breaths and into people of all ages (De victu
I.25 ψυχή … ἐσέρπει ἐς ἅπαν ζῶον, ὅ τι περ ἀνα-
πνέει καὶ … ἐς ἄνθρωπον πάντα καὶ νεώτερον καὶ
πρεσβύτερον). I do not believe this passage can be
naturally interpreted as dealing with reproduction,
cf. Bartoˇs 2015, 209. Furthermore, the fact that psy-
che enters the organism, presumably, with breath,
points to its gaseous rather than liquid nature.
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notion that it is the aer and not the sense organs that ‘see and hear’.36 Finally, the idea
of the soul retreating inside the body during sleep also ﬁnds an interesting parallel in
Diogenes: according to Ps.-Plutarch’s Placita 5.23, sleep is caused by the channels being
ﬁlled with blood and the blood driving the aer from the periphery into the breast and
belly, which thus become warm.
Now if De victu, as I suspect, does indeed follow this general outline (although with
some obvious deviations), it would partially explain the surprising parallel between De
victu and the Stoic notion of sleep as a retreat of the soul to the hegemonikon. This is not
to say that De victu’s soul doctrine in general or its theory of sleep speciﬁcally is derived
directly or exclusively from Diogenes. In fact, there are quite a few crucial differences
that need to be emphasized: ﬁrst of all, psyche in De victu is never identiﬁed with air,
although the author does say in De victu I.25 that it enters the organism with breath.
Second (if my interpretation of De victu I.10 is correct), the higher mental powers are
associated with the ﬁery part of psyche and are located in the chest, not in the brain, like
in Diogenes and De morbo sacro. Finally, in Diogenes’ view, the air does not return to
the center of cognition (the brain) during sleep but seems to move away from it and
proceed from the extremities into the chest and stomach. In De victu, on the other hand,
the expression ‘the soul’s own home’, where psyche retreats during sleep, suggests to me
that what the author had in mind was a path precisely to the body’s cognitive center
(just like in our Stoic parallels).
These are all important differences; important enough to suppose that Diogenes of
Apollonia is almost certainly not, or not the only, source of De victu. I cannot speculate
here about other possible inﬂuences,37 because it would require a separate investigation,
and this is not my primary purpose. I have attempted to show that De victu, in its views
36 Willy Theiler (Theiler 1965, 6–10) even suggested
that the famous ‘windows-simile’, which we ﬁnd
in Lucretius (De rer. nat. 3.359–361), Cicero (Tusc.
I.20.46), and Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. VII.127)
and which likens the sensory organs to windows,
from where the soul, as it were, peeks out, may go
back to Diogenes. It should be noted that ‘oikos’ of
the soul in De victu seems to come from the same
metaphorical vocabulary. Interestingly, Diller (Diller
1941, 376–378) thinks that it might be even earlier
than that and our Skeptical tradition might be right
in attributing this doctrine directly to Heraclitus.
37 Such as Heraclitus. There are in fact some intriguing
similarities between some Heraclitean doxography
(of Stoic and Peripatetic origin) concerning psyche
and De victu. For example, there is one late but in-
triguing report (Hisdosus Scholasticus (Chalcid.
Plat. Tim. cod. Paris. l. 8624 s. XII f. 2), according to
which Heraclitus said that the souls ‘domicillium’
(oikos?) was in the heart, which operates in the body
like the sun in the macrocosm (cor mundi) and occu-
pies a position in the middle of the cosmos (μέσαι
περίοδοι?). Besides, Heraclitus’ own description
of the soul in Fr. 117 DK as a material substance
oscillating between a moist and a dry state (dry-
ness being naturally associated with intelligence)
shares some common traits with De victu’s descrip-
tion of the soul as a σύγκρησις of Fire and Water.
Therefore, it would seem that the question of possi-
ble Heraclitean inﬂuence in De victu’s Seelenlehre is
worth further investigation.
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on the nature of the soul, follows a certain long-standing Materialist tradition; but iron-
ically, an incorrect interpretation of the soul’s journey as a ‘spiritual’ one, has led most




Hynek Bartoˇs. Philosophy and Dietetics in the Hippo-
cratic On Regimen: A Delicate Balance. Studies in
Ancient Medicine 44. Leiden and Boston: Brill,
2015.
Cambiano 1980
Giuseppe Cambiano. “Une interprétation ‘matéri-
aliste’ des rêves: Du Régime IV”. In Hippocratica.
Actes du troisième colloque international hippocratique
(4–9 septembre 1978). Ed. by M. D. Grmek. Paris:
CNRS, 1980, 87–96.
Deroux and Joly 1978
Carl Deroux and Robert Joly. “La version latine
du livre I du traité pseudo-hippocratique ‘Du
Ré-gime’’ (editio princeps)”. In Lettres latines du
Moyen Age et de la Renaissance. Ed. by G. Cambier,
C. Deroux, and J. Préaux. Collection Latomus 158.
Bruxelles: Peeters Publishers, 1978, 129–151.
Detienne 1963
Marcel Detienne. La notion de Daïmôn dans le
pythagorisme ancien. De la pensée religieuse à la pen-
sée philosophique. Bibliothèque de la Faculté de
Philosophie et Lettres de l’Université de Liège
CLXV. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1963.
Diels 1910
Hermann Diels. “Hippokratische Forschungen I”.
Hermes 45 (1910), 125–150.
Diller 1941
Hans Diller. “Die philosophiegeschichtliche Stel-
lung des Diogenes von Apollonia”. Hermes 76
(1941), 359–381.
Dodds 1951
Erik R. Dodds. The Greeks and the Irrational. Berke-
ley, CA: University of California Press, 1951.
Fredrich 1899
Carl Fredrich. Hippokratische Untersuchungen.
Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1899.
Hüffmeier 1961
Friedrich Hüffmeier. “Phronesis in den Schriften
des Corpus Hippocraticum”. Hermes 89 (1961), 51–
84.
Hulskamp 2008
Maithe A. A. Hulskamp. Sleep and Dreams in An-
cient Medical Diagnosis and Prognosis. PhD thesis.
Newcastle University, 2008.
Joly 1960
Robert Joly. Recherches sur le traité pseudo-
hippocratique Du régime. Paris: Les Belles Lettres,
1960.
Joly and Byl 2003
Robert Joly and Simon Byl. Hippocrate. Du régime.
Corpus Medicorum Graecorum 1.2.4. Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 2003.
Jones 1931
William H. Jones. Hippocrates Vol. 4. Loeb Classical
Library 150. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1931.
Jouanna 2012
Jacques Jouanna. “The Theory of Sensation,
Thought and Soul in the Hippocratic Treatise
Regimen: Its Connections with Empedocles and
Plato’s Timaeus”. In Greek Medicine from Hippocrates
to Galen: Selected Papers. Ed. by P. van der Eijk. Lei-
den: Brill, 2012, 195–228.
Palm 1933
Adolf Palm. Studien zur Hippokratischen Schrift Peri
Diaites. PhD thesis. Tübingen, 1933.
Peck 1928
A. L. Peck. Pseudo-hippocrates Philosophus. PhD the-
sis. University of Cambridge, 1928.
Theiler 1965
Willy Theiler. Zur Geschichte der teleologischen
Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles. Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1965.
90
the paths of the soul in the pseudo-hippocratic de victu
van der Eijk 2005
Philip van der Eijk. Medicine and Philosophy in Clas-
sical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature,
Soul, Health and Disease. Cambridge, MA: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005.
van der Eijk 2012
Philip van der Eijk, ed. Greek Medicine from Hip-
pocrates to Galen: Selected Papers. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
ELIZAVETA SHCHERBAKOVA
studied Classics and Ancient Philosophy at Moscow
State University. She received her Candidate of
Sciences degree at 2014 and is currently a research
fellow at the Centre for Classical Studies at the
School of Advanced Studies in the Humanities,
RANEPA in Moscow. Her research interests lie
in the intersection of Early Greek philosophy,
especially Heraclitus, and ancient medicine.
Elizaveta Shcherbakova
Prospekt Vernadskogo, 82, building 9
11957, Moscow, Russia
E-Mail: shagi-ion@ranepa.ru
91
